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Doctors at Risk: A Problem as Viewed
by Decision Analysis
Leonard P. Caccamo, Kimbroe J. Carter,
Barbara A. Erickson, William R. Johnson
and Edward Kessler*
Introduction
Peer Review Organizations (PROs) were established as part of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.1 The Department
of Health and Human Services, through the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), contracts with state PROs to do utilization and
quality control reviews for Medicare and other federally sponsored
medical programs. They review hospitals, nursing homes, outpatient
facilities, home health agencies, and the practices of physicians. In
doing so, they make judgments on whether the delivery of care meets
"professionally recognized standards" and is timely and appropriate.
For physicians, the most important review is of the quality of care
delivered to patients. A nurse, employed by the PRO, randomly selects
a group of records in a hospital to determine whether there have been
failures to meet "screens," pre-determined and pre-set by an agency of
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1 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1988).
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the Department of Health and Human Services. If a record fails to meet
performance criteria, it is referred to physician reviewers, also employed
by the PRO. Upon failure to meet quality care guidelines, sanctions may
be invoked according to the estimated severity of the infraction.
Three levels of severity have been defined, and weights are assigned
to each. Level I is a confirmed quality problem without the potential for
significant adverse patient effects, level II is a confirmed quality
problem with the potential for significant adverse effects, and level III is
a confirmed quality problem with a significant adverse effect and a
weight of 25.2 For example, a level III problem may be one that
required the readmission of the patient to the hospital within 31 days, or
resulted in the patient's death. PROs profile all physicians quarterly.
Interventions of several types are initiated, depending on the total
weights assessed during the quarter or in two consecutive quarters. Any
level Ill infraction is reported to the state medical board for further
review and action.
PRO sanctions place physicians in jeopardy emotionally and
professionally. Their clinical judgment is questioned. They find
themselves in the awkward position of being criticized if they give
treatment irrespective of cost and censured or liable if they do not. A
clear understanding of this dilemma requires a sound application of
clinical judgment,3 which cannot be achieved without the physician
having freedom to think and act in the best interest of patients,
unencumbered by a maze of bureaucratic pronouncements.
The charge given to PROs presumes that medical criteria have been
developed and defined with adequate specificity to expect uniform
2 The weights are respectively 1, 5 and 25. The "quality point system is a federally
mandated condition of participation for all PRO contractors." OrIo STATE MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIANS MEDICARE PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK, 12 and 15 (Revised
ed. 1991).
3 A. F1mNsTN, CLINICAL JUDEM ENT 12 (1967).
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physician decisions. This is clearly not true. Therefore the ability of the
PROs to impose sanctions on the basis of inadequately defined
guidelines is a major factor in causing physician discomfort with the
entire PRO review process. These imperfections in the guidelines are
well described in a recent publication by Kellie and Kelly.4
No doubt, significant numbers of physician delinquencies occur.
However, as we will discuss later, an HFCA report shows that a
significant number of PRO errors also occur. According to PRO
methodology, the physician will be notified that an infraction appears to
have occurred. The physician must then review the complaint and the
records and submit an explanation that the PRO may or may not accept.
This seems fair. Yet, physicians relate that, even when the
explanation fully accounts for the problem, the PRO has frequently
agreed but nevertheless assigned a weight to the "infraction." In this
environment, physicians may well pay more attention to a potential PRO
inquiry than to logical medical reasoning.
Case
A 69 year-old woman with a history of hypertension and anxiety
came to the emergency room with a complaint of chest pain. She had a
number of such episodes in the past 15 years. The present episode was
described as a "grabbing sensation" mid-sternal in location, followed by
episodes of chest "heaviness" that radiated to both arms with a cold,
clammy, and sweaty sensation. She took four nitroglycerin tablets about
10 minutes apart with relief from the fourth tablet. The entire episode
lasted about 40 minutes. She came to the emergency room for further
evaluation, even though she was then free of pain.
Of note is the fact that a stress thallium test performed nine months
4 Kellie & Kelly, Medicare Peer Review Organization Preprocedure Review
Criteria, 265 J.A.M.A. 1265 (1991).
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earlier was found to be normal. She did not smoke or drink. Following
evaluation in the emergency room with an electrocardiogram (ECG),
which showed no Q waves, no ST segment changes and normal T
waves, and a measurement of creatine phosphokinase (CPK) which was
normal, she was admitted to a general floor. Subsequent heart
catheterization showed normal coronary arteries. Further examination
indicated that she had an esophageal motility disorder, a condition which
is helped by coronary dilator drugs such as nitroglycerine.
Our Evaluation
We were assigned to review that case. The physician admitted the
patient to the hospital, although his clinical judgment was that the patient
did not require hospitalization. Yet, he feared criticism if he did not
admit. Accordingly, the patient was admitted to a general floor with the
notation, "Rule out myocardial infarction," placed in the medical record.
Isoenzymes were drawn, and a coronary dilator drug was ordered.
These actions lead to a PRO level II citation indicating medical
mismanagement, "with potential for significant adverse effect." 5
We employed medical decision-making techniques to determine
whether the physician's admitting the patient to a general floor was
justified by the data available at the time of admission. As part of our
evaluation, specifically we attempted to assess the probability of
myocardial infarction (MI) and, from this, the level of care required.
In our assessment, several questions were posed. First, given the
history of the patient, what was the probability of MI? Second, what
was the probability of Ni after the findings on the ECG? Third, when a
normal CPK test report is added to the first two questions, what was the
likelihood of an MI in this patient? Fourth, at what level of probability
should a patient be placed in a monitored unit? Finally, should patient
outcome be considered in determining censure?
5 Supra note 2, at 12 and 15.
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Several studies 6 have addressed the issue of chest pain as it
appears in the patient in an emergency room or a coronary care unit.
Different parameters were set by various investigators in viewing the
problem. The range of probability, considering the patient's findings,
varied widely from 2.2% to 24%. The higher value included an
abnormal ECG. None of these studies assessed probability without an
ECG initially. We accepted the highest probability without an ECG
(24%), arguing that an abnormal ECG would further increase the
probability of a myocardial infarction. Thus, we adopted a worst case
scenario.
Figure 17
Test threshold probability and probability of disease before ECG
Test Threshold Patient Treatment Threshold
I I I
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
6 Goldman, Weinberg, Weisberg, et al., A Computer-Derived Protocol to Aid in
the Diagnosis of Emergency Room Patients with Acute Chest Pain, 307 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 588 (1982); Tierney, Roth, Psaty, et al., Predictors of Myocardial
Infarction in Emergency Room Patients, 13 CRiTICAL CARE MED. 526 (1985);
Fuchs & Scheidt, Improved Criteria for Admission to Cardiac Care Units, 246
J.A.M.A. 2037 (1981); Pozen, D'Agostina, Selker, Sytkowski & Hood, A
Predictive Instrument to Improve Coronary-Care-Unit Admission Practices in Acute
Ischemic Heart Disease, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1273 (1984); Diamond & Forrester,
Analysis of Probability as an Aid in the Clinical Diagnosis of Coronary-Artery
Disease, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350 (1979); Goldman, Cook, Brand, et al. A
Computer Protocol to Predict Myocardial Infarction in Emergency Department
Patients with Chest Pain, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 797 (1988); Mulley, Thibault,
Hughes, Barnett, Reder & Sherman, The Course of Patients with Suspected
Myocardial Infarction, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 943 (1980); Fineberg, Scadden &
Goldman, Care of Patients with a Low Probability of Myocardial Infarction. Cost-
Effectiveness of Alternatives to Coronary-Care-Unit Admission, 310 NEW ENG. J.
NED. 1301 (1984) [hereinafter Care of Patients]; Lee, Rouan, Weisberg, et al.,
Sensitivity of Routine Clinical Criteria for Diagnosing Myocardial Infarction
Within 24 Hours of Hospitalization, 106 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 181 (1987).
7 The ECG should be obtained here when the probability of disease exceeds 5.5%.
Below the testing threshold, only observation is warranted.
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Further, sensitivity analysis was performed on a computer model8
to determine when an ECG was appropriate. The data in this case
indicated that an ECG was appropriate when the probability of MI
exceeded 5.5% (Figure 1). Given the sensitivity of the ECG of 0.85 and
a specificity of 0.96, the negative ECG here reduced the probability of
MI from 24% to 4.7% (Table 1).
Table 1
Probability of disease before and after obtaining ECG,
given positive and negative results
Parameter Probability
(1 =100%)
Sensitivity of ECG 0.85
Specificity of ECG 0.96
Pre-ECG Probability of MI 0.95
Post-Positive ECG Probability of MI 0.87
Post-Negative ECG Probability of MI 0.047
Given the negative ECG result, the need to test further was
evaluated. "When a second independent test is used, the post-test
likelihood determined from the first test becomes the pretest likelihood
for the second test."9 Using the 4.7% piobability after the negative
ECG, the threshold for further testing had risen to 38% (Figure 2).
8 Chalmers, Blum, Buyse, Hewitt & Koch, DATA ANALYSIS FOR CLINICAL
MEDICINE THE QUANTITATvE APPROACH TO PATIENT CARE IN GAIRENTROLOGY.
(Software diskette with manual. International Univ. Press 1988).
9 Diamond & Forester, supra note 6, at 1353.
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Figure 210
Test threshold probability and probability of disease after ECG
Patient Test Threshold Treatment Threshold
I I I
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Thus, no test was necessary unless the probability of M was 38%
or better. Clearly this patient was below this threshold. Yet the
physician performed a CPK test. This test also was negative.
Table 2
Effect of CPK test on the probability of disease following an ECG
Parameter Probability
(1 =100%)
Sensitivity of CPK 0.40
Specificity of CPK 0.80
Pre-CPK Probability of MI 0.047
Post-Positive CPK Probability of MI 0.09
Post-Negative CPK Probability of MI 0.036
At the time it was performed (within four hours of the pain), the
CPK test has low sensitivity (0.4), but much higher specificity (0.8),
and further reduced the probability of MI to 3.6% (Tables 2 and 3).11
10 The testing threshold for preforming a creatine phosphokinase test (CPK) has
risen to 38%. The probability of disease has fallen to 4.7%, and, again, below the
testing threshold, only observation is warranted.
11 From this objective data, it is apparent that the potential for adverse effects was
very small at 3.6% probability of MI. Given this low probability, the patient did not
require monitored care, as the PRO claimed, and care on a general floor was
appropriate. Indeed with such a low probability of i, the patient could safely have
been sent home without a "potential for significant adverse effect." This
interpretation is within the guidelines developed by Goldman in that he proposed that
patients should be monitored when the probability of MI reaches 15%. See
Goldman, Acute Chest Pain: Emergency Room Evaluation, Hospital Practice 94A
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Table 3
Tabular expression of Bayesian analysis of data
Disposition Prior Positive Positive Product Posterior
Probability ECG CPK Probability
Monitored Unit 0.24 0.85 0.40 0.082 0.931
Home (Gen. Floor) 0.76 0.04 0.20 0.006 0.069
Sum 0.088
Disposition Prior Negative Negative Product Posterior
Probability ECG CPK Probability
Monitored Unit 0.24 0.15 0.60 0.022 0.036
Home (Gen. Floor) 0.76 0.96 0.80 0.584 0.964
Sum 0.606
Policy Implications
In this era of rising medical costs, it is incumbent upon practicing
physicians to provide the most cost-effective care. It has been estimated
that placing a patient in a coronary care unit when there is a 5%
probability of MI would cost $2.04 million per life saved; compared to
$0.84 million per life saved for the same patients given routine medical
ward care. 12 Under the same conditions, the costs per year of life
saved would be $139,000 and $61,000, respectively. In the case we
have presented, monitored bed care would have been much more
expensive than general floor care, roughly $800 a day versus $300 a
(Jul. 15, 1986).
It is also important to realize that there are no guarantees regarding outcomes
when using medical decision analysis. Complete certainty never has been, nor ever
will be, possible in making medical decisions. What decision makers try to do is to
maximize the outcomes in favor of those that are the most desirable.
12 Care of Patients, supra note 6.
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day before add-ons. Knowingly or not, the physician was being cost-
effective and could have been even more so without the confused fear of
"big brother" watching.
Let us examine another aspect of physician quandary. In assessing
the most appropriate action for the case presented, we employed a utility
value, which is a measure of outcome. It is important that we look at
whether outcome evaluation is appropriate or inappropriate. If
appropriate, did the PRO use it in making its determination of
wrongdoing in this case? In a recent paper, Kellie and Kelly stressed
that "review criteria be based on reliable synthesis of current
professional criteria ... and; when possible, be outcome validated." 13
In commenting on Kelie and Kelly's paper, Wennberg went further by
stating "the strategies of micro-managed care have led to the
development of a plethora of rules to govern clinical practice."' 14 He
pointed out that patients should be informed of their options and
involved in decisions. Patient input is central to the assignment of utility
values since outcome is the most important issue for the patient.
Therefore outcome must be a consideration in PRO determinations. In
the case presented, the PRO argued that if one states "rule out
myocardial infarction," one has the obligation to place the patient in a
monitored area since this is a standard of practice, citing Brush et al. 15
What the PRO did not state was the content of the paragraph that
followed the sentence cited. Clearly Brush et al.16 made a case for
using various parameters to help decrease admissions in high cost,
13 'Supra note 4, at 1270.
14 Wennberg, Unwanted Variation in the Rules of Practice, 265 J.A.M.A. 1306,
1306 (1991).
15 Brush, Brand, Acampora, Chalmer & Wackers, Use of the Initial
Electrocardiogram in Predicting In-Hospital Complications of Acute Myocardial
Infarction, 312NEW ENG. J. MED. 1137 (1985).
16 Iad
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limited facilities. Our assessment followed the basic ideas that these
authors set forth. In the case cited, had the PRO evaluated the final
outcome, an esophageal motility disorder, they could have backed down
gracefully and reversed their decision to sanction.
The use of outcome, whenever possible, and the attempts to
determine cost-effectiveness in medical care, by and large is not
considered by this PRO. But this PRO only reflects on the activities of
all PROs. Criteria for determining when and how physicians should be
sanctioned are neither uniformly nor objectively applied. Neither are
there standard criteria that would indicate some form of malfeasance.
Kellie and Kelly 17 cite that the criteria to determine when a patient
should have carotid artery surgery, or cataract removal, or a heart
pacemaker implanted vary among PROs. If one accepts the variability
among PROs in these conditions, it is easy to expect variability in other
medical conditions. Variability is clearly demonstrated in a recent
publication by HCFA. 18
In the notes for interpreting the data in this report we find the
following significant statement. "In no case is it possible to use this data
to reach a conclusion about the accuracy of PRO clinical decisions or the
overall quality of PRO review." 19 It seems to us that if HCFA were
confident of the actions of the organizations they supervise and regulate,
such a disclaimer would never be made. To find support for this
interpretation we examined the report of interventions (sanctions) taken
against physicians. Of 48 PROs reporting "23 PROs exceed the national
average of 11.6% errors, and 18 PROs have less than a 5% error rate."
This leaves 7 PROs between the extremes. From a statistical standpoint,
17 Supra note4.
18 Results of Peer Review Organization, Review for the Third Scope of Work.
(Internally compiled report based upon reports covering the period April 1, 1989
through December 31, 1990).
19 Id., at i, Notes for Interpretation of Data.
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the error rate does not follow a normal distribution and is skewed
toward making errors. This error prone state is not conducive to
generating physician confidence in the PRO process. One error in nine
by the scrutinizers is more than can be tolerated, when one's
professional performance is so subject to scrutiny.
It has been stated that quality control is an important function
assigned to the PROs. One does not get a clear sense that this, in fact, is
a goal. In some states, it can be argued, that functions other than quality
control are more likely the goal. In a 20 month period, one PRO referred
37 instances of physician/hospital deficiency to the licensing board out
of a national total of 104 reports. One other PRO reported 28 cases. No
other PRO reported more than 7 cases, and 32 PROs reported none
during the period noted. The notion that quality control is an important
function comes into question because of the marked variability with
which different PROs approach reporting major deficiencies to licensing
bodies. Such variability does not speak well for how criteria are applied,
or whether the same criteria are being used evenly.
This is true even when we acknowledge that there have been some
reversals of earlier decisions. What is telling is the need for HFCA to
make extensive disclaimers regarding the activities of PROs. In a
covering letter,20 the Director of the Office of Peer Review states:
There should be no inference that HFCA sets numeric goals
for PRO denials or for the identification of problems ...
Therefore these numbers are simply data to be used in the
further analysis of PRO performance which HFCA conducts
through a number of mechanisms.
The mechanisms are not elucidated. Also, it should be noted that
PRO contracts are issued for a three year period. Meanwhile PROs
continue to function, can make errors and can level sanctions without
immediate corrective action by the regulatory agency.
20 Husk, Director, Office of Peer Review, HCFA, in memorandum attached to
supra note 18, Spring 1991 (undated).
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In no way do the actions of PROs generate comfort in this
environment. Even more important, when one does not feel free to act,
one cannot act in the best interest of the patient. Errors are to be
expected, but they must be minimized so that they do not infringe the
need and freedom to think. When one must be concerned with what a
PRO might do, instead of the needs of the patient, then one is diverted
from fulfilling one's primary responsibility, and the freedom to think
about that responsibility is thwarted. This has the clear potential for
decreasing, not increasing, the quality of medical care people receive.
Neither does it improve cost-effectiveness. If the quality of medical care
or cost-effectiveness are important issues to HCFA.and the PROs, the
present approaches need drastic revision.
